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CONFRONTING THE COMMUNICATION CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
** Roger J. Miner 
Introduction 
If communication is defined as expression that is clearly 
and easily understood, 1 much of the written and oral expression 
of the legal profession simply fails to measure up to the 
definition. Inability to communicate afflicts all segments of 
the profession and is now pervasive enough to be classified as a 
crisis. It deserves our attention because the effective 
transmission of information, thoughts, ideas and knowledge is 
essential to the efficient operation of our legal system. 
Ineffective expression in legal discourse diminishes the service 
of the bar, impedes the resolution of disputes, retards legal 
progress and growth and, ultimately, undermines the rule of law. 
My purpose is to examine the expressive deficiencies of lawyers 
in their capacities as counselors, litigators, adjudicators, 
legislators and educators. This examination is designed to 
demonstrate that communication failure is a serious and growing 
problem throughout the legal profession. It is also designed to 
suggest that there is a need to clarify, simplify and edify in 
all forms of legal expression. 
* 
46 
I. 
Counselors 
The minute you 
something that you can't 
understand, you can almost 
be sure it was drawn up 
by a lawyer. 
WILL ROGERS 2 
The attorney as c is constrained to communicate 
clients, colleagues and government agencies. Communication with 
clients -- to keep the client informed about the status of a 
case; to comply with requests for information; and to provide an 
explanation of matters sufficient to permit the client to make 
informed decisions -- is an ethical obligation. 3 The Code of 
Professional Responsibil exhorts lawyers to "exert [their} 
best efforts to insure that dee ions of [the ] client[s] are 
made only after the client[s] ha[ve] been informed of relevant 
considerations." 4 Yet, failure to communicate is near the top of 
the list of complaints made by clients about their lawyers. 5 
Very frequently, an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship is occasioned by a lawyer's neglect to impart 
necessary information to a client clearly and promptly. 
Effective counseling requires that clients informed of 
the status of negotiations being conducted on their behalf, 6 of 
offers of settlement in civil matters, 7 and of proffered plea 
bargains in criminal prosecutions. 8 Effective counseling also 
requires that attorneys explain to their clients the nature 
effect of legal instruments, 9 respond to questions bearing on the 
2 
legality or desirability of actions proposed and undertaken, 10 
review the chances of success in litigation 11 and discuss 
arrangements for the payment of reasonable fees for services 
rendered. 12 In all these things, clarity of expression, written 
and oral, is essential. Unfortunately, the reports are rife with 
tales of the disastrous effects that the expressive deficiencies 
of counselors have had upon clients as well as upon counselors 
themselves. 13 Client communication is not merely a device for 
reassuring the client or avoiding fee disp~tes; it is the sine 
gua non of the service provided by the attorney as counselor. 14 
Much ink has been spilled in the effort to promote the use 
of plain English by lawyers. 15 Despite all the criticism 
directed at legalese, however, attorneys continue to employ 
arcane legal language when counseling clients. It is no wonder 
that clients rate lawyers as ineffective communicators and, 
according to surveys, generally will select one lawyer over 
another on the basis of ability to communicate rather than 
technical competence. 16 Professional jargon is meaningless to a 
non-lawyer, and clients do not hesitate to characterize as 
"gobbledegook" the opinions of counsel they are unable to 
comprehend. 17 One author has formulated the following rule for 
communicating with clients as well as the lay public generally: 
"Lawyer-to-laity writing should be fully humanized." 18 This 
excellent rule of communication should govern oral expression 
also, since the counsel of legal advisers is most often sought in 
the course of oral conversation. Indeed, conversational 
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counseling often is a more effective way of advising clients, 
since it is flexible, tentative and ongoing. 19 
An all-too-typical example of attorney-client communication 
failure recently surf aced in a New York City newspaper report of 
a pending defamation action brought by a well-known comedian. 
According to the report 1 the defendant in the case, when 
questioned at a deposition about his $10 million counterclaim for 
services allegedly rendered under a management agreement, said: 
"I don't know what it says and I don't understand it. " 20 The 
immediate result of that testimony was the withdrawal of the 
counterclaim, but the long-term result was to reinforce public 
skepticism of the ability of lawyers to communicate. 
The inarticulateness of the bar has brought us to the point 
where law firms must hire public relations counsel, "media 
advisers, " "image " to speak to the public for them and to 
advise them on how to deal with the press. 21 There was a time 
when some people would refer to a lawyer as a "mouthpiece." How 
surprised they would be to hear a "mouthpiece" speak through 
someone else! One must wonder whether the time is far off when 
an attorney will counsel clients through the medium of a 
"communicator." Nevertheless, public relations is a legitimate 
institutional function of the bar. It is recognized generally 
that the erosion of public confidence in the bar has come about 
largely because of a failure to communicate an understanding of 
the role of lawyers in society and that much needs to be done to 
educate the laity in that regarct. 22 The bar performs its public 
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relations function by providing that education. 23 
The widespread use of legal jargon in discourse with clients 
is sometimes attributed to bad motives on the part of the bar --
escalation of fees, self-promotion and deception. 24 One 
commentator has posited "[i]nertia, incompetence, status, power, 
cost and risk" as "a formidable set of motivations to keep 
legalese." 25 These motivations, he asserts, "lack any 
intellectually or socially acceptable rationale" and "amount to 
assertions of naked self-interest. " 26 My own experience has been 
that only inertia and incompetence drive the excessive use of 
lawyerisms and legalese in counseling clients and drafting legal 
instruments. Inertia is represented by the use of the same 
forms, form books, buzz words, precedent, methods and practices 
over the years. Responses to questions and solutions of problems 
tend to be the same as they were in regard to similar questions 
and problems in the past. Thus there develops in a law practice 
a sameness and a resistance to change that come to have an effect 
on the lawyers in a firm and their successors. In this manner, 
the roots of inertia spread. Incompetence in expression now 
permeates the profession because of deficiencies in the early 
education of young lawyers. Modern education seems to provide an 
insufficient foundation in English grammar, style and usage. As 
a law teacher, I have been astounded by some of the inadequacies 
in written and oral expression demonstrated by the brightest 
students. It should come as no surprise to educators that 
lawyers increasingly are unable to communicate with clients. 
5 
S a counselor is required to "abide by a cl.ient' s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation . and 
[to] consult with client as to the means by which they are to 
be pursued, " 27 is essential that advice as to objectives as 
well as means be conveyed as plainly as possible. The language 
of counseling must be respectful of client autonomy so as to 
. d . f . d . t f . l . d . . k . ?B avoi unJUS ie in er erence in c .1.ent ecisionma ing. -
According to one commentator, the ideal goal is for a lawyer to 
"strive to enable her client not only to know what choices await 
him, but also to reach full decisionmaking capacity, and then she 
should participate in her client's exercise of that capacity by 
offering information, legal advice, and . . other 
perspectives." 29 Since a lawyer's advice "need not be confined 
to purely legal considerations," and often implicates the 
II f 11 f . 11 b . t . . . t ,, 3o u ness o experience" as we as an "o Jee ive viewpoin , 
it is essential that the client be made fully aware of the 
distinction between legal and non-legal advice. The level of 
expression may vary, depending on the level of sophistication of 
the client, but the information imparted must be full and 
complete. 31 Prompt, clear and concise advice, written and oral, 
not only serves the decisionmaking process, but also demonstrates 
respect and concern for the client, 32 elements sometimes absent 
in the contemporary attorney-client relationship. 
The communication skills of those who initiate lawyer-to-
lawyer transmissions have been found wanting in recent years, 
especially in respect of legal memoranda for internal law firm 
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use. A writer has referred to "the countless hours of expensive 
legal time that must be wasted every waking day, as partners and 
senior associates try to make use of . . . badly written law 
memos. " 33 Unnecessary digressions, the mixing of fact statements 
with legal opinions, and lack of order in the presentation of 
arguments have been identified as some of the deficiencies 
found. 34 The lack of directness and excessive formalism of 
expression that characterize poorly written correspondence as 
well as inadequate legal memos are said to be especially apparent 
among young lawyers. 35 Elimination of "incomprehensible 
muddles 1136 in lawyer-to-lawyer discourse will facilitate the work 
of counselors and redound to the benefit of clients. 
II. 
Litigators 
Q. Mr. Jones, is your appearance this 
morning pursuant to a deposition notice 
which I sent to your attorney? 
A. No. Jpis is how I dress when I go to 
work. 
Essential to every litigator is clarity of speech in 
courtroom discourse. Yet trial judges frequently are heard to 
complain of the inability of courtroom lawyers to communicate 
with witnesses, juries and the bench itself. This is indeed a 
strange phenomenon in a day when trial advocacy is taught in law 
schools, in continuing education programs and in books and 
articles covering all aspects of the subject, from opening 
statement through direct and cross-examination and closing 
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argument. 38 Lawyers are bombarded constantly with advertisements 
suggesting the purchase of new books and publications designed to 
improve expression in the courtroom. A recent example: "Trial 
Communication Skills is the collaborative effort of three leading 
experts in the fields of trial practice and communication. 
Together, these three authors bring you a unique understanding of 
interpersonal communication and its application in the 
courtroom. " 39 Another: "[The author] is uniquely qualified to 
write about persuasion approaches for advocates. The basis for 
the information he presents in The Persuasion Edge has been 
collected and refined through the years as he's built his 
reputation in the field of communications and trial advocacy." 40 
Yet another: "Trial Excellence is a monthly newsletter, and the 
only one of its kind. Because it is exclusively about the best 
and most effective communication and performance techniques 
specifically for trial lawyers. 1141 
The stilted language of the law has no place, of course, in 
the questioning of witnesses or in the persuasion of juries. The 
question-and-answer set out at the beginning of this section 
demonstrates convincingly that legal terms should be avoided if 
there is to be understanding between lawyer and witness. In my 
opinion, the expressive deficiencies noted in trial lawyers are 
for the most part attributable to the lack of trial experience. 
At an earlier time, young litigators had the opportunity to cut 
their teeth in trial advocacy by trying simple cases in courts of 
limited jurisdiction. As more experience was gained, they 
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proceeded to the trial of more complex matters, honing their 
courtroom skills as they progressed. Thus were learned the 
1 d d t t th d . f . ~ essons nee e o mas er e art an science o persuasion. 
Today, the economics of law practice make it prohibitively 
expensive to litigate small claims. The salaries paid to newly-
minted lawyers in large law firms are such that the firm cannot 
afford to litigate any but the most lucrative cases. 43 Even as 
to those cases, courtroom resolution is rare, and it is not 
unusual to find litigation partners who never have conducted a 
single trial. As to matters where the amount in controversy is 
small, clients either are relegated to some form of alternate 
dispute resolution or left to their own devices in Small Claims 
Courts. Thus are experienced trial lawyers becoming an extinct 
species. 
Inexperienced litigators frequently have communication 
problems during the direct examination of witnesses because they 
are unable to pose a question that will elicit an answer relevant 
and material to the case. A question that calls for a narrative 
statement and results in a rambling, incoherent mass of fact and 
speculation is one example of such an expressive deficiency. 
Another example is a series of questions written out in exact 
sequence. Responses that deviate from the sequence can cause 
irreparable problems for the rigid questioner. 44 Another common 
failing of inexperienced litigators is the inability to simplify 
the testimony of their expert witnesses so that the jury might 
comprehend the nature of the expert opinion. 45 Communication 
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breakdowns occur also in the opening statement, when counsel 
promises proof they are unable to deliver, 46 and in closing 
argument, when they are carried away by their own rhetoric. 47 
Inexperienced trial counsel convey to the jury the appearance of 
concealment by frequent objections to evidence, 48 and a sense of 
uncertainty by aimless, rambling and lengthy cross-examination of 
adverse witnesses. 49 Finally, advice to clients regarding their 
own testimony, which witnesses to call and what documents to 
offer constitutes a selection process fraught with danger in the 
hands of inexperienced counse1. 50 Apprenticeship and 
specialization in trial advocacy may be the only way left to 
restore communication to the trial courtroom. 
As a long-time observer of the litigation scene, it seems to 
me that the communication crisis has affected appellate advocacy 
even more than trial advocacy. Appellate advocacy comes in two 
parts -- Briefs and Oral Arguments -- and its sole object is the 
persuasion of appellate judges. The Brief is the more important 
part of appellate advocacy, because judges have it in hand both 
before and after oral argument. It is physically with us long 
after the argument evaporates and is forgotten. The Briefs are 
the first thing I look at, even before the decision of the trial 
court or any part of the Appendix or Record. The Briefs are what 
I refer to when writing an opinion or before signing off on a 
colleague's opinion. Yet in my experience it is the rare brief-
writer who seizes the opportunity to employ the clarity, 
simplicity and directness of expression necessary to endow a 
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Brief with maximum persuasive force. 
In the beginning of the Republic, the Brief was merely an 
adjunct to unlimited oral argument. 51 The early Briefs were not 
much more than a list of applicable precedents and authorities, 
as they are today in England, but the oral argument proceeded at 
a leisurely pace, with many questions and answers. The sheer 
bulk of cases in present~day appellate courts makes it impossible 
to proceed in this manner now, and it therefore is most important 
that the Brief serve its communication function by imparting the 
facts and the law to the courts in the most persuasive manner 
possible. That function is not served by Briefs that contain the 
following recurring deficiencies that I have noted in Briefs 
submitted to me: excessive quotations of the record and 
authorities; inaccurate citations; typographical and grammatical 
errors; outdated authorities; disorganized arguments; failure to 
identify and distinguish adverse precedent; lack of clarity; 
prolix sentences; excessive use of adverbs; uninformative point 
headings; inadequate statement of the issues presented; 
incomplete factual presentation; statement of the facts through 
summary of witness' testimony rather than narrative; discussion 
of material outside the record; use of slang; inclusion of 
sarcasm, personal attacks and other irrelevant matters; excessive 
number of points; lack of reasoned argument; illogical and 
unsupportable conclusions; failure to meet adversary's arguments; 
unnecessary footnotes; and neglect to use the format prescribed 
by Court rules. 52 Despite the availability of some excellent 
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guides to Brief writing, 53 the noted deficiencies persist and the 
end of the crisis in this area is nowhere in sight. 
If there is a failure of communication in brief-writing, 
there is an even greater failure in the other part of appellate 
advocacy oral argument. Although the opportunity for oral 
argument has been diminished as the result of the screening 
process employed by some appellate courts, 54 and the time for 
argument (when it is allowed) has been greatly reduced, 55 the 
privilege of speaking to an appellate court continues to be 
valued by some litigators. While litigators will engage in the 
most meticulous preparations for trial, it often seems that the 
same attorneys have not prepared at all for the argument of an 
appeal. Among the best oral communicators I have heard are law 
students in appellate moot court competitions that I have judged. 
The students express themselves effectively because they are 
prepared to do so by reason of study and practice. Real world 
appellate advocates can learn a lesson from the devotion to duty 
displayed by moot court advocates. The ability to present a 
structured argument and to respond to the questions of judges 
within a restricted time period must be cultivated, 56 but only a 
few seem interested in developing the skills of oral argument. 
Deficiency in oral expression is more and more noticeable as most 
litigators, ignoring the opportunity to engage in a Socratic 
dialogue with the judges about their cases, approach oral 
argument as if they really would have preferred to "submit. 1157 
I have published twenty-five suggestions designed to assist 
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litigators in oral communication on appeal. 58 Other judges also 
have undertaken to point up various deficiencies in oral 
argument. 59 With judges, including Justices of the Supreme 
Court, emphasizing the importance of oral argument, 60 it seems 
strange that litigators should treat it so cavalierly. Oral 
argument is one of the great traditions of the Anglo-American 
legal system. It is still a pleasure to see and hear the 
interchange between British barristers and the appeals court 
judges before whom they argue. That interchange is characterized 
by a clarity of expression that is the envy of American appellate 
judges. 
III. 
Adjudicators 
I have decided to allow your spouse 
$100 per week for temporary support. 
Thank you, your Honor. I'll p~pbably 
throw in a few dollars myself. 
Those who adjudicate controversies need to communicate with 
various audiences. Judges who preside at trials must express 
themselves in a way that can be understood by counsel, witnesses 
and the parties appearing before them. Appellate judges must be 
clear and concise in their questions during oral argument and 
must render written opinions that are comprehensible as 
resolutions of disputes at hand and as precedents for future 
cases. Magistrates, referees, administrative law judges, 
arbitrators, special masters, examiners and all those who perform 
adjudicatory functions of any kind must bring perspicuity to 
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their endeavors. 
It is the duty of judges who are bound to conduct trials 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence to see that adequate 
information is conveyed to the jury to enable the jury to reach a 
proper verdict. Federal judges are enjoined to control the 
interrogation of witnesses and the presentation of evidence in 
such a way as to "make the interrogation and presentation 
effective the ascertainment of the truth." 62 To accomplish 
this task, the court is authorized to call witnesses on its own 
motion, 63 to interrogate witnesses by whomever called, 64 and to 
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. 65 The trial judge 
in a federal court, and in many other courts, has the right and 
responsibility to see that the trial is a fair one and, in doing 
so, may summarize, comment upon and draw inferences from the 
evidence for the benefit of the jury. 66 This is an important 
communication function and one that is sometimes ignored by 
judges who consider that the "adversary system" will produce 
whatever "truth" is needed to enable a jury to arrive at a fair 
and just verdict. Unfortunately, as noted previously, expressive 
deficiencies of litigators are not unknown, and the search for 
the truth may well need some assistance from a trial judge. 
Of all the communicative functions of the trial judge, jury 
instruction is probably the most important and the most 
difficult. Jury comprehension studies generally confirm that 
jurors do not understand many of the instructions given to 
them. 67 Efforts have been undertaken to draft pattern jury 
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instructions that will be meaningful to jurors. The problem was 
put succinctly by the Federal Judicial Center's Committee to 
Study Criminal Jury Instructions, in the Introduction to its 1982 
Report: 
The importance of communicating well 
with lay jurors is widely acknowledged by 
drafters of pattern instructions. It is 
nevertheless clear that most pattern 
instructions do not do it very well. It is 
all too easy for the lawyers and judges who 
engage in the drafting process to forget how 
much of their vocabulary and language style 
was acquired in law school. The principal 
barrier to effective communication is 
probably not the inherent complexity of the 
subject matter, but our inability to put 
ourselves in the rosition of those not 
legally trained. 6 
It is noteworthy that the Committee sought the advice of a 
journalist who was not legally trained, and considered research 
in juror understanding in drafting the model criminal 
instructions. Other experiments have been conducted in an effort 
to improve juror comprehension, including the use of tape 
recordings and the furnishing of written copies of the charge.~ 
Much more remains to be done but, in the final analysis, jury 
comprehension of the court's instructions is the responsibility 
of the judge instructing. 
A judge must at all times maintain the appearance of 
impartiality before the jury. While judges have a responsibility 
to ensure that issues are presented clearly and may interrogate 
witnesses for that purpose, it is improper to conduct the 
questioning of witnesses in such a way as to convey the judge's 
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opinion that the witness not worthy of be.lief. 70 This is an 
improper form of judicial communication. Nonverbal conduct 
demonstrating disbelief, untoward actions toward defense counsel 
and improper comment on testimony may deprive a party of a fair 
trial and constitute a prejudicial judicial expression. 71 Judges 
must express fairness and impartiality in both speech and 
demeanor when presiding at trials and that expression represents 
the ultimate communication of the trial judge. 
It is the written opinion in which the skills of the 
adjudicator find their most perfect (or imperfect) expression. 
In regard to appeals, it has been said that "[t]he integrity of 
the [appellate] process requires that courts state reasons for 
their decisions." 72 In point of fact, the integrity of any 
adjudicatory process is promoted by reasoned opinions. While 
courts of first instance resolve controversies, appeals courts 
may establish precedent in the process of resolving 
controversies. Consequently, the audiences for various judicial 
opinions may be different. According to one teacher of judicial 
writing, however, adjudicators share common goals in desiring 
their written opinions "to be clear, concise, precise and 
complete, fair, reasonable, just, balanced and dignified" in 
order to serve a number of purposes: "to decide, dispose of and 
record cases; persuade, exhort, order, teach, inform, explain and 
reason with audiences ranging in legal expertise from litigants 
and the media to courts of appellate review." 73 A tall order 
indeed! 
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Although there is a need for a faster, better way to write 
opinions, 74 the bar remains opposed to dispositions by summary 
order or by short statements in open court, at least in regard to 
appellate decisions where the dispositions cannot be cited as 
precedent. 75 The bar may be right, because each decision of each 
adjudicator should stand on its own and be subject to examination 
by all in the great common law tradition. While the opinions of 
most adjudicators rarely will be classified as literature, even a 
one page ruling on a topic as arcane as trademarks can sparkle 
with its clarity and brevity. 76 More than any other writer, the 
adjudicator must heed the elementary principles of composition, 77 
because a "judicial opinion in what may seem an ordinary case, 
phrased in language that expresses an honest and genuine passion 
for social order and justice, may be remembered, at least by 
those affected, long after the popular play or novel has run its 
course." 78 As a communicator, the adjudicator can do no better 
than to remember Justice Cardozo's admonition that the "sovereign 
virtue for the judge is clearness. " 79 
IV. 
Legislators 
That one hundred and fifty lawyers should do 
business together ought not to be expected. 
Thomas Jefferson (on the U.S. Congress) 80 
Those in the legal profession whose responsibility it is to 
formulate and draft legislation often are faulted for fuzziness 
of language. Indeed, every lawyer has had to wrestle, at one 
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time or another, with statutes, especially of the tax variety, 
that are tantamount to incomprehensible. Yet we are told by a 
legislative lawyer: 
If bills suffer from any of what Professor 
Dickerson has labeled the "diseases of 
language; ambiguity, overvagueness, 
overprecision, overgenerality or 
undergenerality," they do so either by 
intent, in the case of a planned vagueness, 
or as a result of what Justice Frankfurter 
and others have characterized, somewhat 
exaggeratedly, as the inexact nature of 
words. Only infr~fluently is an enacted bill 
sloppily drafted. 
We are told by the same author that much legislation is the 
product of compromises, of the process of majority building and 
of problems of foreseeability. 82 Finally, we are instructed, 
with just cause, that courts should exercise more self-restraint 
in statutory interpretation and that legislative history is not a 
very good indicator of legislative intent. 83 
It seems beyond cavil that legislative bodies know what 
plain English is. Many states have adopted laws requiring the 
use of plain English in consumer contracts, insurance policies 
and similar documents; Congress itself has adopted a number of 
statutes containing plain English requirements. 84 The New York 
law establishing "Requirements for use of plain language in 
consumer transactions" is a paradigm. It simply requires certain 
defined agreements to be "l. Written in a clear and coherent 
manner using words with common and everyday meanings; 2. 
Appropriately divided and captioned by its various section. 1185 
The statute has the beauty of simplicity86 and, while it must be 
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conceded that the constraints of the legislative process 
generally do not permit laws to be written in this manner, the 
contrast with most legislation is stark. Perhaps there is a 
middle ground. 
Legislatures cannot have it both ways. They cannot write 
vague, complex and difficult statutes and complain that the 
courts don't interpret them properly or don't exercise sufficient 
"restraint." Courts are faced daily with actual cases and 
controversies involving real-life people whose disputes must be 
resolved. They cannot refer those disputes to committees or 
commissions for study and for report at some day far in the 
future. Courts must do the best they can with what they have, 
including legislative history and attempts to "divine" the 
legislative intent. Some legislative bodies themselves have 
provided rules, albeit contradictory at times, for the 
interpretation of their statutes. 87 More guidance for the courts 
is required in order that both branches may perform the roles 
assigned to them. 88 
Despite all the legislative constraints, it can be said that 
legislator-lawyers have, by attention to plain language laws 
affecting consumers, recognized the depth of the communication 
crisis more than any other branch of the profession. 89 We can 
only hope that this concern for plain language will extend to 
other types of legislation as well. In this connection, it is 
heartening to note that a recent seminar sponsored by the Indiana 
University Institute for Legal Drafting and held in conjunction 
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with the National Conference of State Legislatures, attracted 
fifty-seven legislative draftsmen from twenty states, American 
Samoa and the Virgin Islands. The Director of the Institute 
"stated that the goal of the seminar was to provide professional 
draftsmen with the tools to produce understandable and readable 
versions of what the legislature wants. " 90 
v. 
Educators 
Everywhere I go I'm asked if I think the 
university stifles writers. My opinion is 
that they don't stifle enough of them. 
Flannery O'Connor 91 
Law students comprise the primary audience for legal 
educators. The secondary audience is comprised of the practicing 
bar, other academics and the general public, including those 
interested in the books and learned articles of law professors. 
There is evidence of a growing estrangement between the 
professors and their primary audience. Law teachers are becoming 
less interested in teaching professional skills and professional 
subjects than in interdisciplinary studies and other academic 
pursuits. 92 According to a recent newspaper dispatch, "many law 
professors are paying less attention to the legal doctrines that 
occupy the thoughts of most practicing lawyers and judges, and 
instead are turning to more abstract disciplines like economics 
and political theory. "93 Included in the dispatch is a reference 
to a law professor who is described as "one of the most sought-
after legal academics in the country" by reason of his expertise 
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in dispute management in Medieval Icelandic society. 94 
The changing focus of academics, from doctrinal scholarship 
to interdisciplinary studies, promises serious consequences for 
the legal profession. Academics are communicating more with each 
other and less with their students or the profession of which 
they are such an important part. 95 The upshot is that new 
lawyers are less-equipped to handle the demands of modern law 
practice than those of a previous generation. With legal 
education "schizophrenic" and law faculties "factionalized, 1196 
the profession suffers. 
But even more serious than the failure of the professors to 
communicate with their students is their failure to teach 
communication. Teachers of legal writing courses do not receive 
the academic recognition they deserve, and the poor writing 
skills of graduate lawyers are the immediate consequence. 97 
Academics compete for space in the law reviews, 98 but little 
attention is given to student writing. With academic tenure, 
promotion and status dependent on publishing, 99 professors turn 
the bulk of their attention to writing rather than teaching. 
Thus do law students fail to obtain the oral and written skills 
of expression necessary for the survival of the profession. 
Language is, after all, the medium in which the profession 
conducts its business. 100 
Moreover, many academics, by virtue of their disdain of law 
practice, have succeeded only in imbuing their students with the 
ability to express themselves in professional jargon without 
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communicating the human voice of the law. 101 Academics are not 
exempt from the disease of legalese and of ten add confusion and 
uncertainty to the law by introducing new legal theories that 
have no relation to the real world. 102 
Judge Harry T. Edwards, my colleague on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and a former law 
professor himself, has said that "the profession can no longer 
afford the curriculum of law schools [to be] isolated in a world 
of its own." 103 It is time once again to reexamine legal 
education in the public interest. Proposals for apprenticeship 
training beyond law school should be examined. 104 If law 
educators continue to be of the opinion that law schools do not 
have a mission to prepare students for the practice of law, then 
post-graduate training may be the only alternative. lOS A remedy 
must be found for the deficient communication of legal knowledge 
and skills. 
CONCLUSION 
The various branches of the legal profession perform their 
work through the media of written and oral expression. 
Communication, defined as expression clearly and easily 
understood, therefore is essential to the effective functioning 
of the bar and, ultimately, to the maintenance of our legal 
system and the perpetuation of the rule of law. The bar is 
constrained to communicate with such diverse audiences as 
clients, colleagues, judges, witnesses, juries, administrative 
bodies, law students, academicians and the public at large. Of 
22 
the deterioration of the abilities of lawyers -- counselors, 
litigators, adjudicators, legislators and educators -- to 
communicate with these audiences, there can be no doubt. It 
seems to me that the deterioration now has reached the level of a 
crisis that must be confronted. Until the crisis engages the 
attention of the legal profession, however, the process of 
confrontation cannot begin. It is my hope that this presentation 
will serve to focus some attention on the critical problems of 
legal communication. 
23 
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